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ABSTRACT 
 
The theory of complex systems has gained significant ground in recent years, and with it, complex 
network theory has become an essential approach to complex systems. This study follows 
international trends in examining the interlocking South African bank director network using 
social network analysis (SNA), which is shown to be a highly connected social network that has 
ties to many South African industries, including healthcare, mining, and education. The most 
highly connected directors and companies are identified, along with those that are most central to 
the network, and those that serve important bridging functions in facilitating network coherence. 
As this study is exploratory, numerous suggestions are also made for further research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ince the mid-1990s, the theory of complex systems has gained significant ground in a variety of academic 
disciplines, including in economics. Most of the social environment can be described as a complex 
system, where millions of actors interact to produce complex emergent properties, non-linear interactions 
and adaptability, as Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 118) define a complex system, “a complex system is a system 
built from a large number of nonlinearly interacting constituents, which exhibits collective behaviour and, due to an 
exchange of energy or information with the environment, can easily modify its internal structure and patterns of 
activity.” International trade is no different; indeed, Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 118) specifically name financial 
markets as an example of a complex system. 
 
Along with complex systems theory, the theory of complex networks has recently gained ground in a 
variety of disciplines, starting with the seminal studies by Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Barabási and Albert (1999) 
(although the theory itself can be traced back to Leonard Euler’s Königsberg bridge puzzle of 1736, see Amaral and 
Ottino, 2004, p. 151). Complex network theory is an approach to complex systems, and uses network theory’s 
ability to represent a network visually, along with network theory’s variety of mathematical formulae, to calculate 
the roles entities play in a network. Barabási (2009, p. 413) writes: 
 
Today the understanding of networks is a common goal of an unprecedented array of traditional disciplines: Cell 
biologists use networks to make sense of signal transduction cascades and metabolism, to name a few applications 
in this area; computer scientists are mapping the Internet and the WWW; epidemiologists follow transmission 
networks through which viruses spread; and brain researchers are after the connectome, a neural-level connectivity 
map of the brain. Although many fads have come and gone in complexity, one thing is increasingly clear: 
Interconnectivity is so fundamental to the behaviour of complex systems that networks are here to stay. 
 
S 
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Network theory has proved an important and essential approach to complex systems in fields as diverse as 
epidemiology, biology, security studies, and communication science (Luke & Stamatakis, 2012, p. 362). Economics 
has also utilised network theory: Smith and White (1992, p. 861) already wrote that Snyder and Kick (1979) and 
Steiber (1979) were “the first explicit attempts to use the network approach to examine the world-system.” Since 
these publications, global economic systems have been approached as networks in numerous studies (see Nemeth & 
Smith, 1985; Smith & White, 1992, p. 857; Jackson, 2007; De Benedictis & Tajoli, 2008; Flandreau & Jobst, 2005, 
2009). Fricke, Finger, and Lux (2013, p. 2) write, “[I]nvestigations of complex systems in terms of their network 
properties gain more and more attention in economics following the lead of other disciplines in which network 
analyses have already a long tradition.” 
 
A classic application of network theory in the field of economics is the study of interlocking directorships 
(see e.g., Heemskerk, 2013; Comet & Pizarro, 2011; Conyon & Muldoon, 2006; Robins & Alexander, 2004; Davis, 
Yoo, & Baker, 2003; Alexander, 2003; Mintz & Schwartz, 1985; Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 1982; Levine, 1977). By 
approaching the network of directors as a social network, insight is gained into how ideas spread within an 
economy. As Davis, Yoo, and Baker (2003, p. 305) write: 
 
...while the origins of ties among firms and directors may be primarily social rather than strategic, dozens of studies 
since the late 1980s have documented the influence of shared directorships on choices about corporate strategy and 
structure, from the ideological tone of political activism to basic choices about organization design. 
 
At the heart of a country’s financial industry lies the banking industry; Davis, Yoo, and Baker (2003, p. 
302) call commercial banks “the traditional centre of the interlock network” (although in the US economy, banks 
lost their position of centrality by the mid-1990s, Davis, Yoo, and Baker, 2003, p. 309). Banks often recruit well-
connected CEOs (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003, p. 303), which allows them to monitor important economic sectors 
closely, and it therefore comes as no surprise that the banking industry in particular has been studied as a network 
(Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). Approaching the banking industry as a network therefore provides a view of the financial 
core of a country’s economy in terms of interlocking directorships, and those companies that share this core can be 
seen as belonging to key industries in an economy. 
 
The current study examines the current interlocking directorships associated with the banking industry in 
South Africa (as of 1 October 2013). Using the list of South African banks provided in the South African Reserve 
Bank’s Department of Banking Supervision (2012), data on currently serving company directors was gathered using 
the detailed company overviews provided through Bloomberg’s BusinessWeek (http://www.businessweek.com/), 
and it was recorded which directors are affiliated with which other directors, apart from those in their own company. 
Because a director does not necessarily serve on the boards of all subsidiary companies of a parent company, the 
boards of directors of subsidiary companies was also distinguished. The companies involved were also recorded, 
meaning that person A is a director of bank B, but also sits on the board of company C with directors D, E, and F, 
who in turn also serve on the boards of companies G, H, and I. The resulting network is what Watts (2004, p. 248) 
calls a bipartite network, which consists of two types of entities: people and companies (see also Koskinen & Edling 
2012, p. 309; Conyon & Muldoon, 2006, p. 1326). In total, this network consists of 3,204 entities (people and 
companies) and 10,157 relationships, and these relationships were plotted using Sentinel Visualizer, a specialised 
Social Network Analysis program developed for the US intelligence community. Although the data is surely not 
complete, it is a comprehensive database of interlocking directorships centred on the South African banking 
industry. In this article, the emphasis falls on what Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 210) call “Microscopic 
topological properties of a network,” namely node degrees, betweenness, and the existence of particular edges, 
rather than on macroscopic network properties such as average path length, scale-free link distributions and the like, 
because macroscopic network properties have already been thoroughly documented in the study of company director 
networks (see e.g., Nicholson, Alexander, & Kiel, 2004; Conyon & Muldoon, 2006). 
 
OVERVIEW OF NETWORK THEORY 
 
Because network theory is an unfamiliar theoretical approach in South Africa, the following section 
provides an overview of the major principles involved. 
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Virtually any system can be studied as a network, which consists of entities (also called actors, nodes, or 
vertices), and their relationships (also called ties, links, or edges) (Brandes, Freeman, & Wagner, 2013, p. 805; Onel, 
Zeid, & Kamarthi, 2011, p. 120; Newman, 2001, p. 404; Newman, 2003, p. 168; Dos Santos et al., 2012, p. 240). 
The interdisciplinary roots of network theory, which are found mainly in mathematical graph theory, sociology, and 
anthropology, result in a multitude of terms associated with the same phenomena, but the core of the theory remains 
the same regardless of the application: the total network is capable of a greater functionality than the sum of 
individual parts (emergence). In network theory, the emphasis falls on the relationships between entities rather than 
on entities’ individual characteristics (Serrat, 2010, p. 2). 
 
Numerous studies – particularly by the physics community – have found further universal properties of 
complex networks. Newman (2003) distinguishes between four types of complex networks: biological networks, 
technological networks, information networks, and social networks. Biological networks include ecosystems, protein 
networks, neurological networks, metabolic processes, and food webs, while technological networks include the 
Internet, transport networks, and power grids. Information networks include the World Wide Web and citation 
networks in academic fields, while social networks include everything from film actor networks, terrorist networks, 
and family and friendship networks, to interlocking director networks of international companies and organisations. 
All of these exhibit similar characteristics, including amongst others small-worldedness, the existence of highly 
connected entities, scale-free link distributions, robustness, clustering, and assortativity (Amaral & Ottino, 2004, p. 
151; Buchanan, 2003, p. 15), as Barabási (2009, p. 412) writes: 
 
... probably the most surprising discovery of modern network theory is the universality of the network topology: 
Many real networks, from the cell to the Internet, independent of their age, function, and scope, converge to similar 
architectures. It is this universality that allowed researchers from different disciplines to embrace network theory as 
a common paradigm. 
 
Small-worldedness refers to the phenomenon that, on average, every entity in a network is connected to 
every other entity via a relatively short path, as noted by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Strogatz (2004[2003], p. 232) 
writes, “the ‘small-world’ phenomenon is much more than a curiosity of human social life: It’s a unifying feature of 
diverse networks found in nature and technology” (see also Watts 2004[2003], p. 100). In terms of company 
directors, the research done by Conyon and Muldoon (2006, p. 1337) on directorships in the US, UK, and Germany, 
as well as by Nicholson, Alexander, and Kiel (2004) on directorships in the US and Australia, support Watts and 
Strogatz’s prediction that small-worldedness is a near-universal characteristic of complex networks: both found 
short average path lengths between entities in company director networks. 
 
Scale-free (power law) link distributions were first identified by Barabási and Albert (1999), and denotes 
that there are few highly connected entities in a network, while the majority of entities are poorly connected (Watts, 
2004, p. 248; Buchanan, 2003, pp. 84-85). Scale-free link distributions are similar to Pareto’s Law – the familiar 
80/20 division of wealth in society, where the majority of the population each hold little of a country’s total wealth, 
while the majority of a country’s wealth can be found in the hands of a select few. In terms of network topology, the 
power law predicts that link distributions will be similarly scaled, with the vast majority of entities having few ties 
in the network, while a few entities will be extremely well connected.  This trend has also been compared with the 
highly similar Matthew Effect, Zipf’s Law, and Lotka’s Law of scientific productivity (Newman, 2005, p. 340), and 
has been found in diverse networks; as Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 207) write, the phenomenon has been 
observed in “actor co-appearances in movies, scientific paper citations, Internet physical structure, air traffic and 
airport networks, Internet social networks, sexual contact networks, epidemic networks, metabolic networks, gene-
coexpression networks, and many other systems” (see also Newman, 2005, p. 325, Barabási, 2009, p. 412; 
Buchanan, 2003, p. 83; Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman, 2009). As can be expected, the same link distribution can be 
observed in interlocking directorship networks, as Conyon and Muldoon (2006, p. 1335) write: 
 
The average size of a US board is about 10 members and each director, on average, has 1.63 directorships 
(including the directorship at his or her main company). An individual occupying only one board position is a one-
board director. Analogously, a person with two directorships is a two-board director. In the US, the overwhelming 
majority of directors (about 80%) have only one directorship. About 13% hold precisely two positions, implying that 
a very small fraction of directors (7%) hold more than two director posts. 
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This characteristic of complex networks results in network robustness: when the majority of entities are not 
well connected, complex networks were found to be highly robust against random failures, because it is unlikely that 
the few well connected entities will fail when surrounded by a large number of less well connected entities. 
However, complex networks were found to be highly susceptible to cascading failures when these highly connected 
entities are removed from the network (Buchanan, 2003, p. 131). The scale-free link distribution is thus a proverbial 
double-edged sword in terms of network robustness: complex networks are robust, but only against random failure 
(Watts, 2004[2003], pp. 191-2; Haldane, 2009, p. 11). Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 126) refer to this characteristic 
of complex systems as Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT), where “A complex system, as understood by HOT, is 
very flexible to both the internal perturbations and errors and the unfavourable external factors.” Simultaneously, 
“highly optimized, tolerant systems are significantly vulnerable to very rare, unusual events (e.g., cascading 
failures).” 
 
Another topological feature of complex networks is clustering, which refers to the tendency of entities to 
form clusters or subgroups, where entities within the cluster are more highly connected than they are with entities 
outside the cluster (Zhu, Watts, & Chen, 2010, p. 152). In terms of network structure, clustering often leads to the 
formation of triangles, where; e.g., entities B and C, who are connected to entity A, are also connected to each other. 
More formally, clustering can be defined as “the propensity for vertex pairs (e.g., boards) to be connected if they 
share a mutual neighbour” (Conyon & Muldoon, 2006, p. 1322, see also Newman, 2003, p. 183). 
 
Assortativity refers to the tendency of similar entities to form connections. In terms of social networks, it 
has been found in numerous studies that people tend to associate according to race, income level, and/or age 
(Newman, 2003, p. 191). A specific form of assortativity is degree correlation, where the best-connected entities 
tend to form ties to other highly connected entities (Watts, 2004, pp. 258-259). This is one of few areas where social 
networks differ from other types of networks: while social networks are assortative, other types of networks were 
found to be disassortative (Newman, 2003, p. 193). Again, assortativity was found in director networks: Conyon and 
Muldoon (2006, p. 1342) for instance found a positive degree correlation between directors, and write, “[D]irectors 
who sit on many boards appear to do so in the company of others who also sit on many boards.” 
 
While it is not the objective of this article to test the South African banking industry director network 
against the above topological features of complex networks, note that clusters and highly-connected entities 
(forming star structures) can be identified visually through a graph: 
 
 
Figure 1: The Total Network of Directors in the South African Banking Industry 
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Here it can be seen that although the industry is highly connected, two clusters are unconnected to the rest 
of the network (at the top right of the graph). These are Habas Investments (1960) Ltd. and Albaraka Turk Katilim 
Bankas, who are also not connected to each other. The implication is that these two banks are not connected to the 
South African economy via the director network, and their separation influences an analysis of the network directly, 
as the following discussion shows. 
 
CENTRALITY MEASURES 
 
While the previous section discussed some macro level characteristics of complex networks with specific 
reference to interlocking director networks, at the micro level, entities’ roles can be studied with a variety of 
measures. In order to calculate the roles entities play in a network, the most widely used centrality measures are 
those developed by Freeman (1979), namely degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality, as 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  However, because closeness centrality cannot be calculated when parts of a 
network are unconnected, as is the case here since two banks are not connected to the rest of the industry, these two 
banks were removed from the network to facilitate the following discussion. 
 
Degree centrality calculates the number of ties an entity has with its direct neighbours (Donges et al., 2009, 
p. 158; Barnes & Ritter, 2001, p. 207), and a high degree centrality simply means that such an entity has more direct 
ties to his neighbours than other entities. Degree centrality is a measure of activity (Freeman, 1979, p. 238); in the 
banking director network, the people with the highest degree centralities are those with the most connections to 
other entities, both to people and companies. The formula for calculating degree centrality for node i is the following 
(Prell, 2012, p. 97): 
 
 n n 
CD(i) = ∑xij  =  ∑xij 
 j=1 i=1 
 
Where, 
 
xij = the value of the tie from actor i to actor j (the value being either 0 or 1), and thus it is the sum of all ties 
n= the number of nodes in the network 
 
Note however that, in contrast to the assertion by Mahdi et al. (2012, p.  278), degree centrality is not necessarily a 
measure of influence, because it is also important to note where an entity’s connections lead (Prell, 2012, p. 97). An 
entity could have a large number of connections to lower-level entities, which are less important in terms of the 
overall structure of the network than connections to entities with a high betweenness centrality. 
 
Betweenness centrality measures to what extent an entity lies on the shortest path between other entities in 
a network, and often whether an entity lies on the only path between other entities. An entity with a high 
betweenness centrality is therefore in a favourable position to control the flow of information in a network. As 
Freeman (1979, p. 221) originally noted, betweenness centrality identifies “a point that falls on the communication 
paths between other points [which] exhibits a potential for control of their communication.” Furthermore, entities 
with a high betweenness centrality contribute to network coherence; without them, a network easily disintegrates 
into unconnected clusters (Dos Santos et al., 2012, p. 240; Hafner Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 2009, p. 564), 
and therefore entities with a high betweenness centrality contribute most to facilitating the flow of information in a 
network. Betweenness centrality is calculated with the following formula (Prell, 2012, p. 105): 
 
CB(k) = ∑∂ikj / ∂ij, i≠j≠k 
 
∂ikj = the number of geodesics linking actors i and j that pass through node k; 
∂ij = the number of geodesics linking nodes i and j, and thus the betweenness calculation is for node k. 
 
In terms of the interlocking director network, Davis, Yoo, and Baker (2003, p. 319) refer to “linchpin 
directors” who serve as bridges between companies, and use the betweenness centrality measure to identify these 
linchpins. 
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Closeness centrality refers to how close an entity is, in terms of connections, to all other entities in a 
network. Entities with a high closeness centrality have a short path to most other entities in a network (Butts, 2008, 
p. 23), and are therefore central role players. Closeness centrality is calculated with the following formula (Prell, 
2012, p. 108): 
 
CC(i) = ∑dij where dij = the distance connecting actor i to actor j. 
 
The following table gives the degree-, betweenness-, and closeness centrality scores of the highest-scoring 
40 company directors in this network: 
 
Table 1: The Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness Centrality Scores of the Highest-Scoring 40 Company Directors 
Entity Name 
D
eg
re
e
 
Entity Name 
B
et
w
ee
n
-
n
es
s 
Entity Name 
C
lo
se
n
es
s 
1. Jan Jonathan Durand  151 Steven B. Epstein 1.0000 Nigel George Payne 1.0000 
2. Cheryl Ann Carolus  141 Jan Jonathan Durand 0.8469 Benedict James van der Ross 0.9861 
3. Steven B. Epstein  130 Cheryl Ann Carolus 0.8265 Jan Jonathan Durand 0.9851 
4. Stephen Koseff  126 
Nomavuso Patience 
Mnxasana 
0.8201 Paul Cambo Baloyi 0.9847 
5. Nomavuso Patience 
Mnxasana  
120 Fani Titi 0.8189 Stephen Koseff 0.9782 
6. Benedict James van der 
Ross  
116 Stephen Koseff 0.7227 
Douglas Denoon Balharrie 
Band 
0.9762 
7. Myles J. D. Ruck  99 
Benedict James van der 
Ross 
0.7065 Fani Titi 0.9611 
8. Hugh Sidney Herman  95 
Douglas Denoon Balharrie 
Band 
0.6071 Myles J. D. Ruck 0.9521 
9. Nigel George Payne  95 Grant Glenn Gelink 0.5736 Wendy Elizabeth Lucas-Bull 0.9492 
10. Fani Titi  93 Nigel George Payne 0.5724 Nomavuso Patience Mnxasana 0.9484 
11. Grant Glenn Gelink  92 Myles J. D. Ruck 0.5165 William Rodger Jardine 0.9360 
12. Peter Mangalani 
Malungani  
91 William Rodger Jardine 0.4935 Grant Glenn Gelink 0.9293 
13. William Rodger Jardine  91 Sandile D. M. Zungu 0.4739 Koosum Parsotam Kalyan 0.9277 
14. Bernard Kantor  90 Koosum Parsotam Kalyan 0.4662 Cheryl Ann Carolus 0.9269 
15. Sandile D. M. Zungu  88 Robert Haldane Smith 0.4476 
Nolulamo Nobambiswano 
Gwagwa 
0.9179 
16. Kgomotso Ditsebe 
Moroka  
85 Paul Cambo Baloyi 0.4021 Hugh Sidney Herman 0.9160 
17. Haruko Fukuda  84 
Wendy Elizabeth Lucas-
Bull 
0.3746 Dhanasagree Naidoo 0.9113 
18. Leon Crouse  84 Hugh Sidney Herman 0.3674 
Thoko Martha Mokgosi-
Mwantembe 
0.9056 
19. Mary Sina Bomela  82 Gloria Tomatoe Serobe 0.3276 Peter Mangalani Malungani 0.9021 
20. Paul Cambo Baloyi  82 Kgomotso Ditsebe Moroka 0.3186 Gloria Tomatoe Serobe 0.9003 
21. Robert Haldane Smith  81 Mary Sina Bomela 0.3011 Sandile D. M. Zungu 0.8981 
22. Yolanda Zoleka Cuba  81 
Thoko Martha Mokgosi-
Mwantembe 
0.2990 Leon Crouse 0.8981 
23. Douglas Denoon 
Balharrie Band  
78 Dhanasagree Naidoo 0.2915 Peter Bambatha Matlare 0.8966 
24. Gloria Tomatoe Serobe  78 Yolanda Zoleka Cuba 0.2900 Paul Kenneth Harris 0.8943 
25. Hendrik Jacobus du Toit  78 Trevor Stewart Munday 0.2683 Steven B. Epstein 0.8869 
26. Nolulamo 
Nobambiswano Gwagwa  
78 Louis Leon Von Zeuner 0.2535 Bernard Kantor 0.8820 
27. Peregrine Kenneth 
Oughton Crosthwaite  
78 Peter Bambatha Matlare 0.2518 Amanda Tandiwe Nzimande 0.8772 
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Table 1 cont. 
28. Peter Richard Suter 
Thomas  
78 
Nolulamo Nobambiswano 
Gwagwa 
0.2361 Trevor Stewart Munday 0.8757 
29. Trevor Stewart Munday  78 Peter Mangalani Malungani 0.2323 Bradley Fried 0.8714 
30. Wendy Elizabeth Lucas-
Bull  
78 Haruko Fukuda 0.2219 Louis Leon Von Zeuner 0.8695 
31. Bradley Fried  77 Bradley Fried 0.1956 Haruko Fukuda 0.8666 
32. Koosum Parsotam 
Kalyan  
76 
Peregrine Kenneth Oughton 
Crosthwaite 
0.1645 Glynn R. Burger 0.8662 
33. Thoko Martha Mokgosi-
Mwantembe  
75 Leon Crouse 0.1448 Robert Haldane Smith 0.8660 
34. Amanda Tandiwe 
Nzimande  
73 Hendrik Jacobus du Toit 0.1412 
Peregrine Kenneth Oughton 
Crosthwaite 
0.8657 
35. Dhanasagree Naidoo  73 
Amanda Tandiwe 
Nzimande 
0.1186 Hendrik Jacobus du Toit 0.8657 
36. Louis Leon Von Zeuner  73 Bernard Kantor 0.0901 Mary Sina Bomela 0.8656 
37. Paul Kenneth Harris  73 
Peter Richard Suter 
Thomas 
0.0695 Peter Richard Suter Thomas 0.8656 
38. Peter Bambatha Matlare  73 Lauritz Lanser Dippenaar 0.0577 Kgomotso Ditsebe Moroka 0.8645 
39. Glynn R. Burger  72 Paul Kenneth Harris 0.0553 Yolanda Zoleka Cuba 0.8645 
40. Lauritz Lanser Dippenaar  69 Glynn R. Burger 0.0281 Lauritz Lanser Dippenaar 0.8636 
 
This means that Jan Jonathan Durand has the highest number of direct connections in this network, Cheryl 
Ann Carolus the second highest number, etcetera. Note that degree centrality in this instance refers to directors’ 
connections to both other directors and companies. As discussed previously, degree centrality is a measure of 
activity, and thus these are the directors that are most active in the South African bank industry in terms of the 
interlocking director network. Jan Jonathan Durand is for instance linked directly to a large number of directors, to a 
total of 145 connections to directors (his remaining six connections are to companies). 
 
The betweenness centrality scores indicate to what extent entities serve as linchpins by connecting 
companies, providing coherence to the industry. Again, Durand scores high, along with Steven B. Epstein, Cheryl 
Ann Carolus, and Nomavuso Patience Mnxasana. 
 
The interlocking director network of course serves to link companies together, providing the opportunity 
for the banking industry to monitor various sectors of the economy to mitigate lending risks. The following table 
provides the degree-, betweenness-, and closeness centralities of the 40 highest-scoring companies in this network: 
 
Table 2: The Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness Centralities of the 40 Highest-Scoring Companies 
Entity 
D
eg
re
e
 
Entity 
B
et
w
ee
n
-
n
es
s 
Entity 
C
lo
se
n
es
s 
1. Investec Limited 45 Tiger Brands Limited 0.0774 Bidvest Group Ltd 0.9319 
2. International Crisis Group 
(The) 
43 Deenadayalen Konar 0.0637 MTN Group Limited 0.8800 
3. Investec plc 36 CIDA Empowerment Fund 0.0455 Investec Limited 0.8633 
4. Standard International 
Holdings SA 
34 Santam Ltd. 0.0446 Investec plc 0.8624 
5. Standard Chartered PLC 32 Barclays Africa Group Limited 0.0425 FirstRand Limited 0.8584 
6. Investec Bank Plc 29 MTN Group Limited 0.0302 
Standard Bank Group 
Limited 
0.8479 
7. FirstRand Limited 28 
Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd. 
0.0208 
Anglo American Platinum 
Limited 
0.8447 
8. Radius Ventures, LLC 27 Bidvest Group Ltd 0.0203 
The Standard Bank of South 
Africa Limited 
0.8369 
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Table 2 cont. 
9. Standard Bank Group 
Limited 
27 
Kagiso Tiso Holdings 
Proprietary Limited 
0.0198 JSE Limited 0.8355 
10. Bidvest Group Ltd 23 FirstRand Limited 0.0194 Investec Bank Plc 0.8354 
11. Steinhoff International 
Holdings Ltd. 
23 
Pan-African Capital Holdings 
(PTY) Ltd. 
0.0173 
Barclays Africa Group 
Limited 
0.8349 
12. Tiger Brands Limited 23 Nedbank, Ltd. 0.0161 Deenadayalen Konar 0.8311 
13. Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont SA 
21 Transnet SOC Limited 0.0157 Mr Price Group Limited 0.8268 
14. Aveng Limited 20 
Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont SA 
0.0153 Remgro Limited 0.8253 
15. DigiCore Holdings 
Limited 
20 ConvergeNet Holdings Limited 0.0144 Pick n Pay Stores Ltd. 0.8241 
16. Investec Bank Limited 20 Aveng Limited 0.0132 Aveng Limited 0.8220 
17. MMI Holdings Limited 20 Woolworths Holdings Limited 0.0129 FirstRand Bank Limited 0.8214 
18. Nedbank, Ltd. 20 Vantage Capital Group 0.0127 Discovery Limited 0.8207 
19. Anglo American Platinum 
Limited 
19 Incwala Resources (Pty) Ltd. 0.0121 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, The 
0.8205 
20. Barclays Africa Group 
Limited 
19 
Alexander Forbes Equity 
Holdings (Proprietary) Limited 
0.0120 Naspers Ltd. 0.8155 
21. Discovery Limited 19 Imperial Holdings Limited 0.0115 Telkom SA SOC Limited 0.8153 
22. FirstRand Bank Limited 19 Ambit Properties 0.0115 Angus W. B. Band 0.8132 
23. Grindrod Limited 19 The World Bank Group 0.0113 Investec Bank Limited 0.8125 
24. Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Company 
(South Africa) 
19 DigiCore Holdings Limited 0.0105 Tiger Brands Limited 0.8124 
25. Telkom SA SOC Limited 19 Eqstra Holdings Limited 0.0105 MMI Holdings Limited 0.8105 
26. African Rainbow Minerals 
Limited 
18 Tongaat Hulett Limited 0.0105 Metropolitan Life Limited 0.8082 
27. CIDA Empowerment 
Fund 
18 Annuity Properties Limited 0.0105 Grindrod Limited 0.8078 
28. Absa Bank Limited 17 Liberty Holdings Ltd. 0.0099 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. 0.8064 
29. ABSA GROUP LTD 17 
Anglo American Platinum 
Limited 
0.0098 Absa Bank Limited 0.8058 
30. African Rainbow Minerals 
Gold Ltd. 
17 Telkom SA SOC Limited 0.0098 ABSA GROUP LTD 0.8057 
31. MTN Group Limited 17 Investec plc 0.0097 Fedsure Holdings Ltd. 0.8045 
32. Naspers Ltd. 17 Distell Group Limited 0.0093 
Old Mutual Life Assurance 
Company (South Africa) 
0.8027 
33. Nedbank Group Limited 17 
African Rainbow Minerals 
Limited 
0.0091 
Woolworths Holdings 
Limited 
0.7949 
34. Old Mutual plc 17 Sun International Ltd. 0.0087 PPC Limited 0.7930 
35. Alexander Forbes Equity 
Holdings (Proprietary) 
Limited 
16 Fedsure Holdings Ltd. 0.0085 Hudaco Industries Limited 0.7929 
36. Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, The 
16 Curro Holdings Limited 0.0083 Oceana Group Ltd. 0.7923 
37. FirstRand EMA Holdings 
Limited 
16 Old Mutual plc 0.0081 Nedbank, Ltd. 0.7896 
38. Imperial Holdings Limited 16 Pioneer Food Group Ltd. 0.0070 
Pick n Pay Holdings 
Limited 
0.7879 
39. Kagiso Tiso Holdings 
Proprietary Limited 
16 Angus W. B. Band 0.0070 BSi Steel Limited 0.7857 
40. The Standard Bank of 
South Africa Limited 
16 
Nimble Group (Proprietary) 
Limited 
0.0068 Nedbank Group Limited 0.7849 
 
Again, a high degree centrality means that these companies have the highest number of direct connections 
to directors, while a high betweenness centrality means that these companies function as linchpins in connecting the 
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network around the banking industry, and closeness centrality indicates that these companies are relatively closely 
connected to the rest of the network. Note the companies with high betweenness centrality scores: some are in the 
mining industry (e.g., African Rainbow Minerals Limited and Anglo American Platinum Limited), others in the food 
industry (e.g., Pioneer Food Group Ltd., Woolworths Holdings Limited, and Tongaat Hulett Limited), and even the 
paper and tourism industries are represented (e.g., Sappi Limited and Sun International Ltd.). 
 
All of the major South African banks, ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedbank, and FirstRand, are connected to 
each other, as the following graph shows: 
 
 
Figure 2: The Connections Between the Four Major South African Banks 
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In this graph, it can be seen that although clusters form around individual banks (e.g., around Standard 
Bank on the right), numerous close connections exist between banks. In general, Nedbank (at the bottom) is more 
closely associated with Absa (left) and Standard Bank (right) than with FirstRand (at the top). In addition, other 
South African banks are also found on this graph, meaning that they also have close ties with the major banks: 
Bidvest can be seen in the middle, with close ties to particularly Absa, while Grindrod can be found at the top, with 
close ties to FirstRand. 
 
The above table also shows that the South African banking industry is linked to a variety of companies in 
the South African economy. One such industry is private healthcare. In the following graph, the second degree 
connections of Mediclinic International Limited, Discovery Limited, and Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited 
are represented, where it can be seen that these three companies are closely connected: 
 
 
Figure 3: The Second Degree Connections of Mediclinic International Limited, Discovery Limited and Life Healthcare 
Group Holdings Limited 
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These three companies are of course differently affiliated. Discovery is connected to the Bidvest Group 
Limited, Grindrod Limited, and FirstRand Limited, while Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited is connected to 
ABSA Group Limited and Nedbank Group Limited, and Mediclinic International Limited is not closely affiliated to 
any South African bank. 
 
The banking industry is of course also affiliated with the mining industry: Palabora Mining Company 
Limited, Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited, Endeavour Mining Corporation, Mmakau Mining (Pty) Ltd., 
TEAL Exploration & Mining Incorporated, Sentula Mining Limited, BlackRock World Mining Trust plc, and 
Mvuzo Mining Ltd. are all part of this dataset (remember that the network uses data on the banking industry, not the 
mining industry). However, a second degree exploration of these companies’ connections reveals that none of these 
companies are as closely affiliated with the banking industry as the healthcare industry is, and it is only when third 
degree connections (indicated in Table 3) are explored that connections to banks are found. 
 
Table 3: The Third Degree Bank Affiliations of the Mining Companies1 
Company South African Bank 
Palabora Mining Company Limited Nedbank Group Limited, ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 
Nedbank Group Limited, ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited, 
Bidvest Group 
Endeavour Mining Corporation ABSA Group 
Mmakau Mining (Pty) Ltd. Capitec Bank 
Sentula Mining Limited Grindrod Limited, FirstRand Limited,  
TEAL Exploration & Mining Incorporated Grindrod Limited, Standard Bank Group Limited 
BlackRock World Mining Trust plc Investec Limited 
Mvuzo Mining Ltd Nedbank Group Limited 
 
More specifically, four companies are present in the dataset that specialise in platinum: Northam Platinum 
Ltd, Anglo American Platinum Limited, Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., and Royal Bafokeng Platinum Limited. 
Apart from Anglo American Platinum Limited, which is linked to the banking industry in two degrees, these 
companies are also not affiliated with the banking industry in two degrees, but in three degrees, they are affiliated in 
the following way: 
 
Table 4: The Third Degree Bank Affiliations of Platinum Mining Companies 
Company South African Bank 
Northam Platinum Ltd ABSA Group 
Anglo American Platinum Limited ABSA Group, Mercantile Bank Limited, Standard Bank Group Limited 
Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd. ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited, Nedbank Group Limited 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum Limited ABSA Group, Standard Bank Group Limited 
 
What can be extrapolated from the above is that although the mining industry is not as closely affiliated 
with the banking industry as the healthcare industry, some banks – in particular ABSA and Standard Bank – are 
relatively closely connected to the mining industry in South Africa. This distance between the banking industry and 
the mining industry, in contrast with the health care industry, warrants further exploration in another study. 
 
The same occurs when the second degree connections of various oil companies are explored. While Aker 
Oilfield Services AS, Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd., Oil and Natural Gas Cor Ltd., Forest Oil Corporation, Oil Refineries 
Ltd., Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd., Shell Oil Products Company LLC, and Sasol 
Ltd. are all part of the dataset, none of these companies have close affiliations (second degree connections) with the 
South African banking industry. Within three degrees, these companies are connected to the following South 
African banks: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Of course there are many more mining companies; these are simply provided as an example. 
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Table 5: The Third Degree Bank Affiliations of Oil Companies 
Company South African Bank 
Aker Oilfield Services Standard Bank Group Limited 
Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. Bidvest Group Limited 
Oil and Natural Gas CorLtd. Standard Bank Group Limited 
Forest Oil Corporation Bidvest Group Limited 
Oil Refineries Ltd. Habas Investments (1960) Ltd. 
Petroleum, Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Ltd. Ubank Limited and Grindrod Limited 
Shell Oil Products Company LLC Standard Bank Group Limited 
Sasol Ltd. 
ABSA Group Limited, Sasfin Holdings Limited, Bidvest 
Group Limited, Standard Bank Group Limited 
 
The most striking feature in the above table is that Sasol has more connections with the South African 
banking industry than any other company, although Sasol’s long standing in the South African economy would 
predict that it would be the best-connected company of the above oil companies. What is surprising, however, is that 
Standard Bank and Bidvest dominate this industry – a feature of the South African economy that could be explored 
in future studies. 
 
The only tertiary education institutions that are connected to the banking industry are the Universities of 
Rhodes, South Africa, Kwazulu Natal, Witwatersrand, and Cape Town. Of these universities, only one university 
has more than one connection: The University of Cape Town, which is linked through three directors (Paul M. G. 
Truyens, Mncedisi Mayekiso, and Anthony H. Miller). When second degree connections of universities are however 
considered, meaning not only to which directors they are linked but also to which other companies these directors 
are linked, Cape Town and Kwazulu Natal are linked, while Rhodes and the Witwatersrand are also connected: 
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Figure 4: The Second Degree Connections of Universities 
 
Like the mining industry, tertiary institutions are therefore not closely affiliated with the banking industry, 
but a more interesting question to ask would be why traditionally English universities are connected to the banking 
industry, and not traditionally Afrikaans universities (e.g., the University of Pretoria, Stellenbosch, North-West, or 
the Free State). 
 
THE CORE/PERIPHERY STRUCTURE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING DIRECTOR NETWORK 
 
The distinction between core and periphery is an important concept in the application of network theory to 
international trade. A position at the core of the network indicates that such an entity is well connected and occupies 
a central role in the network, while those entities positioned at the periphery play a lesser role in their industry and 
are also less connected. To position entities within the network, force-directed algorithms are employed, which see 
entities within a network as similar to physical entities, with their connections acting in a similar way to physical 
forces of attraction and repulsion (Merico, Gfeller, & Bader, 2009, p. 922; Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991 
;Suderman & Hallett, 2007, p. 2654). Kwapień and Drożdż (2012, p. 208) for instance provide the following graph 
constructed for the stock exchange of 1000 American companies traded on NYSE or NASDAQ: 
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Figure 5: A Network of American Companies Traded on NYSE and NASDAQ 
 
Here it can be seen how some companies concentrate connections around them and are subsequently 
positioned at the core, while less well-connected companies are positioned at the periphery. The companies at the 
very periphery of the network for instance only have one connection, and notably, that one connection is also to a 
company that has few other structurally important connections. In contrast, entities at the core are linked to other 
well-connected entities through a multitude of ties – a visual manifestation of degree correlation as mentioned 
above. 
 
In the banking director network under consideration here, a similar core/periphery structure can be 
observed. Of course, both Habas Investments (1960) Ltd. and Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankas are generally 
peripheral, as they do not have ties (in terms of directors) to the rest of the network. Since the network under 
consideration here is concerned with South African banks, all the other South African banks are found in the core of 
this network. The other companies that share the core, however, are more interesting: these are the companies that 
are positioned closest to the South African banking industry.  The following graph shows where 20 of these 
companies can be found (in no particular order): 
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Table 6: Other Companies That Share the Core 
Company 
1. Sun International Limited 
2. Illovo Sugar Limited 
3. Mr Price Limited 
4. Anglo American PLC 
5. BSi Steel Limited 
6. Woolworths Holdings Limited 
7. Life Healthcare Group Holdings Limited 
8. Naspers Limited 
9. Sasol Limited 
10. Vodafone Group Public Limited Company 
11. PAREXEL International 
12. Pick ‘n Pay 
13. Lewis Group 
14. Spar Group Limited 
15. Clicks Group Limited 
16. De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited 
17. Tiger Oats Limited 
18. Cashbuild 
19. Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 
20. Nampak Limited 
 
 
Figure 6: Central Companies in the Bank Industry Director Network 
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Here it can be seen how the force-directed algorithms has positioned the above companies – all at the core 
of the South African banking director network. Future studies could explore these companies’ connections in more 
detail: which connections contributed to these companies’ positions? Are there specific sectors of the South African 
economy that are particularly well represented at the core? Which companies (and by implication, financial sectors) 
are on the periphery, and why? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has shown how densely connected the banking industry director network is in South Africa. 
More specifically, it was shown which directors and companies have the highest degree-, betweenness-, and 
closeness centrality scores, meaning which companies and directors are the most active, play the role of linchpins 
most often, and are closest to the rest of the network specifically. Because this was an exploratory study using a 
method that is unfamiliar in South Africa, the article also generated many questions: Why is the healthcare industry 
more closely connected to the banking industry than the mining industry? Which other financial sectors and 
companies are at the core of this network, which ones are at the periphery, and why? In addition, this study provided 
only a single glimpse of a dynamically evolving network: How did it change over time? How did it change since 
1994? 
 
Most importantly, this article has shown that the theory of complex networks has a lot to offer South 
African economics, as it has in other parts of the world, and in other disciplines as well. A more detailed effort is 
needed to map the South African economy – in terms of director networks but also trade networks in general – in 
order to come to a better understanding of how the South African economy functions as a complex system. 
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